中譯 ： 唐健（齊澤克學會）
Chinese trans. : Kin Tong（Zizek Society HK）
作者 : 齊澤克
發表日期 : 2015-07-06 14:23
原文標題 : Slavoj Žižek on Greece: This is a chance for Europe to awaken
原文連結 :
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/07/Slavoj-Zizek-greece-chance-europe-awaken
(Varoufakis during negotiations. Pretending the Greek question is administrative, rather than ideological, is tantamount to bullying. Photo: Milos Bicanski/Getty Images)
(圖為希臘[前]財長瓦魯法基斯在談判。[歐洲官僚]假扮希臘問題是管理而不是意識形態[即政治]問題的行徑等同欺凌。攝影者： Milos Bicanski)
The unexpectedly strong No in the Greek referendum was a historical vote, cast in a desperate situation. In my work I often use the well-known joke from the last decade of the Soviet Union about Rabinovitch, a Jew who wants to emigrate. The bureaucrat at the emigration office asks him why, and Rabinovitch answers: “There are two reasons why. The first is that I’m afraid that in the Soviet Union the Communists will lose power, and the new power will put all the blame for the Communist crimes on us, Jews – there will again be anti-Jewish pogroms . . .”
希臘公投出人意料地宣告一個強烈的No[不]，成為[歐洲人]在絕境中投下的歷史性的一票。在我寫的書中我常常重複同一個笑話：有關前蘇聯解體前十年中流行的一個著名的猶太人笑話：一位名叫拉賓諾維奇的猶太人想移民。出境部門的官僚問他為甚麼，拉賓諾維奇回答說："有兩個理由。第一個是我怕蘇共將失去權力，而新政權會將共產黨的罪行都算在我們猶太人頭上----結果是將再次出現猶太人大屠殺。"
“But,” the bureaucrat interrupts him, “this is pure nonsense. Nothing can change in the Soviet Union! The power of the Communists will last for ever!”
官僚打斷他："但你這完全是天方夜談。蘇聯不會出現任何改變，我們共產黨將千秋萬代！"
“Well,” responds Rabinovitch calmly, “that’s my second reason.”
"好吧" 拉賓諾維奇平靜地回答："那就是我要移民的第二個理由"。
I was informed that a new version of this joke is now circulating in Athens. A young Greek man visits the Australian consulate in Athens and asks for a work visa. “Why do you want to leave Greece?” asks the official.
我被告知這個笑話的新版本正在雅典流傳：一名希臘青年到雅典的澳洲領事館要求一張工作簽證。 "為甚麼你要離開希臘?" 官員問到。
“For two reasons,” replies the Greek. “First, I am worried that Greece will leave the EU, which will lead to new poverty and chaos in the country . . .”
"兩個理由" 希臘人回答："首先，我擔心希臘將脫離歐盟，那樣希臘將出現新貧窮和混亂‧‧‧"
“But,” interrupts the official, “this is pure nonsense: Greece will remain in the EU and submit to financial discipline!”
這名官員馬上打斷他："但你這純粹是天方夜談：希臘將留在歐盟並臣服於金融紀律之下"
“Well,” responds the Greek calmly, “this is my second reason.”
"好吧"，希臘人平靜地回答："這就是我的第二個理由"
Are then both choices worse, to paraphrase Stalin?
那麼----容許我改寫一下斯大林的名句----［希臘公投中的］兩種選擇是否都更糟？
The moment has come to move beyond the irrelevant debates about the possible mistakes and misjudgements of the Greek government. The stakes are now much too high.
是時候放下那種有關希臘政府可能犯錯和誤判的[無關痛癢的]辯論----我們現在所面對的賭注比這大得多。
That a compromise formula always eludes at the last moment in the ongoing negotiations between Greece and the EU administrators is in itself deeply symptomatic, since it doesn’t really concern actual financial issues – at this level, the difference is minimal. The EU usually accuses Greeks of talking only in general terms, making vague promises without specific details, while Greeks accuse the EU of trying to control even the tiniest details and imposing on Greece conditions that are harsher than those imposed on the previous government. But what lurks behind these reproaches is another, much deeper conflict. The Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, recently remarked that if he were to meet alone with Angela Merkel for dinner, they would find a formula in two hours. His point was that he and Merkel, the two politicians, would treat the disagreement as a political one, in contrast to technocratic administrators such as the Eurogroup president, Jeroen Dijsselbloem. If there is an emblematic bad guy in this whole story, it is Dijsselbloem, whose motto is: “If I get into the ideological side of things, I won’t achieve anything.”
希臘和歐盟管理者之間的持續談判總是在最後一刻失去妥協配方，這個現象本身就是一個巨大的症狀[deeply symptomatic]，因為問題其實真的和實際的金融問題無關----在金融層面，雙方的分歧微不足道。[真正的問題在於，]歐盟通常指控希臘經常談論一般性原則、在缺乏特定細節的情況下做出含糊的承諾，而希臘則指控歐盟連最微小的環節都試圖操縱，並在希臘頭上實施比前任政府還要苛刻的條件。希臘首相齊普拉斯［Alexis Tsipras］最近評論道，假如他能夠和默克爾[Angela Merkel]單獨晚飯，兩人就能在兩小時內找到解決方案。他的意思是作為政治家，他本人和默克爾會將視分歧為政治問題----相對於歐洲集團[Eurogroup, 歐盟成員國財長的非正式會議] 主席戴松布倫[Jeroen Dijsselbloem]這類技術官僚式的管理人員[technocratic adminstrators]。假如在我們這個故事中存在一個標誌性的壞人，他肯定就是戴松布倫。這位技術官療的座右銘是："假如我陷入意識形態，我將一事無成"［“If I get into the ideological side of things, I won't achieve anything.”］。
This brings us to the crux of the matter: Tsipras and the former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, who resigned on 6 July, talk as if they are part of an open political process where decisions are ultimately “ideological” (based on normative preferences), while the EU technocrats talk as if it is all a matter of detailed regulatory measures. When the Greeks reject this approach and raise more fundamental political issues, they are accused of lying, of avoiding concrete solutions, and so on. It is clear that the truth here is on the Greek side: the denial of “the ideological side” advocated by Dijsselbloem is ideology at its purest. It masks (falsely presents) as purely expert regulatory measures that are effectively grounded in politico-ideological decisions.
這句話將我們帶到問題的核心：齊普拉斯與其前任財長瓦魯基斯----他已在七月六日請辭----兩人一直採取一種自身屬於公開政治過程（在當中所有決定最終都屬於"意識形態層面"----即全部建基於社會的規範性取向[normative preference]）的態度進行談判，而歐盟官僚則一直擺出一副純粹在處理詳細規章性措施的態度進行談判。當希臘人拒絕這種態度並提出更根本的政治問題時，他們就被技術官僚指控說謊、逃避具體問題... 諸如此類。很明顯，這次真理站在希臘那邊： 戴松布倫對"意識形態"的否認是最登峰造極的意識形態［ideology at its purest］。這種態度將實際上植根於政治意識形態的決定［politico-ideological decisions］假扮成（虛假地呈現為）純粹專家式的規章性措施［purely expert regulatory measures］。
On account of this asymmetry, the “dialogue” between Tsipras or Varoufakis and their EU partners often appears as a dialogue between a young student who wants a serious debate on basic issues and an arrogant professor who, in his answers, humiliatingly ignores the issue and scolds the student on technical points (“You didn’t formulate that correctly! You didn’t take into account that regulation!”). Or even as a dialogue between a rape victim who desperately reports what happened to her and a policeman who continuously interrupts her with requests for administrative details.
有見於這種不對稱性，齊普拉斯和瓦魯法基斯與他們的歐盟同伴之間的"對話"常常看似一個企圖認真討論基本問題的年青學生與其傲慢教授之間的談話。這名傲慢教授的回答總是羞辱人地忽視學生的問題並在技術層面責罵學生（ "你沒有正確地闡述問題！ 你沒有考慮那條規則！"）。又或者看似一名極想報案的被姦者與一名借行政規條不停地打斷受害者的警察這兩者間的對話。
This passage from politics proper to neutral expert administration characterises our entire political process: strategic decisions based on power are more and more masked as administrative regulations based on neutral expert knowledge, and they are more and more negotiated in secrecy and enforced without democratic consultation. The struggle that goes on is the struggle for the European economic and political Leitkultur (the guiding culture). The EU powers stand for the technocratic status quo that has kept Europe in inertia for decades.
從真實政治［politics proper］到中立專家式管理[neutral expert administration]的轉移，總結了我們今天的整個政治過程： 建基於權力[考慮]的策略性決定越來越多地披上專家知識之管理規章的外衣，這些決策越來越存在於秘密談判之中［negotiated in secrecy］並在缺乏民主咨詢[democratic consultation]的情況下被執行。[現在，真正在我們眼皮底下］正在進行的鬥爭是一場爭奪歐洲經濟和政治的文化領導權的鬥爭［the European economic and political Leitkultur (the guiding culture)］。歐盟權力當局代表了數十年來讓歐洲停留在昏睡狀態的技術官僚[的統治]現狀。
In his Notes Towards a Definition of Culture, the great conservative T S Eliot remarked that there are moments when the only choice is the one between heresy and non-belief, ie, when the only way to keep a religion alive is to perform a sectarian split from its main corpse. This is our position today with regard to Europe: only a new “heresy” (represented at this moment by Syriza) can save what is worth saving in European legacy: democracy, trust in people, egalitarian solidarity. The Europe that will win if Syriza is outmanoeuvred is a “Europe with Asian values” (which, of course, has nothing to do with Asia, but all with the clear and present tendency of contemporary capitalism to suspend democracy).
在其《朝向文化的一種定義的筆記》中[Notes Towards a Definition of Culture]，傑出的保守主義者艾略特［Eliot］評論說在某些時候，人們只剩下異端和不信這兩個選擇。換言之，有時挽救一個宗教的唯一手段是在其屍體上執行一個宗派分裂［sectarian split］。這就是今天我們對歐洲的立場：只有一個"新異端"（由希臘的薩利莎政府[Syriza]代表）才能夠挽救歐洲遺產中值得挽救的東西：民主、對人的信任、平等的團結。假如薩利莎被擊倒，歐洲將變成一個"擁抱亞洲價值的歐洲"［“Europe with Asian values”］（當然，這裡的亞洲價值和亞洲完全無關，它不過是當代資本主義架空民主的傾向）。
***
In western Europe we like to look on Greece as if we are detached observers who follow with compassion and sympathy the plight of the impoverished nation. Such a comfortable standpoint relies on a fateful illusion – what has been happening in Greece these past weeks concerns all of us; it is the future of Europe that is at stake. So when we read about Greece, we should always bear in mind that, as the old saying goes, de te fabula narrator (the name changed, the story applies to you).
在西歐，我們喜歡採取一種彷彿我們是帶着同理和同情心跟蹤希臘這個窮困民族的困境的一群抽離的觀察者的態度觀看希臘。這樣一種舒服的立足點依賴一個註定的假象[fateful illusion]----［但真相是，］過去幾個星期在希臘發生的事情可以變成我本人的故事；［現在我們］的真正賭注是整個歐洲的未來［it is the future of Europe that is at stake］。因此當我們閱讀有關希臘的報導，我們應該永遠記住一句老話： de te fabula narrator (主角的名字一改，故事就變成你我的故事）
An ideal is gradually emerging from the European establishment’s reaction to the Greek referendum, the ideal best rendered by the headline of a recent Gideon Rachman column in the Financial Times: “Eurozone’s weakest link is the voters”.
在歐洲建制派對希臘公投的反應中逐漸浮現出一種理想［an ideal］，這種理想的最佳代表是[專欄作家]拉赫曼[Gideon Rachman]在金融時報專欄的標題： "選民是歐元區最脆弱的環節"［"Eurozone's weakest link is the voters"］。
In this ideal world, Europe gets rid of this “weakest link” and experts gain the power to directly impose necessary economic measures – if elections take place at all, their function is just to confirm the consensus of experts. The problem is that this policy of experts is based on a fiction, the fiction of “extend and pretend” (extending the payback period, but pretending that all debts will eventually be paid).
在建制派的理想新世界之中，歐洲擺脫了這一 "最脆弱的環節"----專家贏得了直接強行實施必要經濟措施的權力----而萬一世上還存在選舉這種東西的話，其功能就僅僅是確認專家們的共識。問題在於，專家們的政策建基於虛假的事物： "延長然後假扮"["extend and pretend"] （延長還款期，假扮所有債項最終有可能被清還）。
Why is the fiction so stubborn? It is not only that this fiction makes debt extension more acceptable to German voters; it is also not only that the write-off of the Greek debt may trigger similar demands from Portugal, Ireland, Spain. It is that those in power do not really want the debt fully repaid. The debt providers and caretakers of debt accuse the indebted countries of not feeling enough guilt – they are accused of feeling innocent. Their pressure fits perfectly what psychoanalysis calls “superego”: the paradox of the superego is that, as Freud saw it, the more we obey its demands, the more guilty we feel.
為甚麼這個假象如此頑固？不單因為這個假象讓德國選民更容易接受債務延長的安排；也不單因為免除希債有可能觸發葡萄牙、愛爾蘭和西班牙的同類要求；而[真正的原因] 是因為當權者不希望債務被完全清還［譯者的強調］［do not really want the debt fully repaid］。債權人和債務管理者指責負債國家沒有表現出足夠的內疚----負債國的罪名是它們自認無辜的態度。［債權國所施加的］這種壓力完美地定義了精神分析稱為 "超我"［Superego］的心理機制： 超我的悖論式機制[paradox of the superego]----正如弗洛伊德指出----在於我們越遵從它的要求，我們就越內疚。
Imagine a vicious teacher who gives to his pupils impossible tasks, and then sadistically jeers when he sees their anxiety and panic. The true goal of lending money to the debtor is not to get the debt reimbursed with a profit, but the indefinite continuation of the debt, keeping the debtor in permanent dependency and subordination. For most of the debtors – for there are debtors and debtors. Not only Greece but also the US will not be able even theoretically to repay its debt, as is now publicly recognised. So there are debtors who can blackmail their creditors because they cannot be allowed to fail (big banks), debtors who can control the conditions of their repayment (the US government) and, finally, debtors who can be pushed around and humiliated (Greece).
想像一位惡毒的老師向學生安排了不可能完成的功課，然後當他看見學生焦慮和恐慌的表情時就露出虐待狂的嘲弄笑容。借款的真正目的不是期待一筆附帶利潤的還款，而是債項的無限期延長、使債務人停留在永恆的依賴和臣服之中。對大部份債務人而言----存在大量的債務人。不僅僅是希臘，包括美國在內的國家甚至即使在理論上都不可能清還全部債務----而這個事實是被公開承認的。結論是： 有些債務人（大銀行）可以勒索債權人，因為牠們大得不能破產；有些債務人（美國政府）可以操控他們的還債條件；然後有些債務人（希臘）可以被我們抓出去遊街、公開羞辱。
The debt providers and caretakers of debt basically accuse the Syriza government of not feeling enough guilt – they are accused of feeling innocent. That’s what is so disturbing for the EU establishment about the Syriza government: that it admits debt, but without guilt. They got rid of the superego pressure. Varoufakis personified this stance in his dealings with Brussels: he fully acknowledged the weight of the debt, and he argued quite rationally that, since the EU policy obviously didn’t work, another option should be found.
債權人和債務管理機構對希臘政府的根本指控是它不夠內疚----希臘等國家被指控覺得自己無辜----而這一點正正是薩利莎政府[Syriza] 最困擾歐盟建制派當局的地方： 薩利莎承認債務，卻沒有感到內疚。希臘人竟然[膽敢]擺脫超我的壓力！？瓦魯法基斯在他與布魯塞爾的交手過程中人格化了［personified］這種立場： 他完全承認債務的重擔，並且他很理性地提出： 由於歐盟的還債方案明顯失敗，我們應該尋找其他出路［ since the EU policy obviously didn't work, another option should be found］。
Paradoxically, the point Varoufakis and Tsipras have made repeatedly is that the Syriza government is the only chance for the debt providers to get at least part of their money back. Varoufakis himself wonders about the enigma of why banks were pouring money into Greece and collaborating with a clientelist state while knowing very well how things stood – Greece would never have got so heavily indebted without the connivance of the western establishment. The Syriza government is well aware that the main threat does not come from Brussels – it resides in Greece itself, a clientelist, corrupted state if ever there was one. What the EU bureaucracy should be blamed for is that, while it criticised Greece for its corruption and inefficiency, it supported the very political force (the New Democracy party) that embodied this corruption and inefficiency.
悖論地，瓦魯法基斯和齊普拉斯不斷重申的一點是： 薩利莎政府是債權人能夠至少取回部份借款的唯一希望。瓦魯法基斯本人很難理解的一個謎團： 為甚麼銀行們在完全清楚［緊縮方案導致希臘陷入長期經濟停滯因而永遠無法償還欠款的］後果的情況下，仍然大筆大筆地將錢倒進希臘並且同這個侍從國家合作？----假如當初沒有西方當權者的縱容，希臘又怎麼可能一路負上如此沉重的債務？薩利莎政府清楚地意識到主要的威脅並非來自布魯塞爾［歐盟總部］----真正的威脅來自希臘內部： 一個名符其實的侍從國、一台腐敗的國家機器。歐盟官僚們應該受到強烈譴責的原因在於：一方面牠們批評希臘腐敗、缺乏效率，另一方面卻一直支持這股腐敗的政治力量（希臘的新民主黨［New Democracy party］）
The Syriza government aims precisely at breaking this deadlock – see Varoufakis’s programmatic declaration (published in the Guardian), which renders the ultimate strategic goal of the Syriza government:
薩利莎政府正是以[解決]這個死結為目標：看看瓦魯法基斯的綱領性宣言（在《衛報》發表）如何闡釋薩利莎政府的終極策略性目標：
A Greek or a Portuguese or an Italian exit from the eurozone would soon lead to a fragmentation of European capitalism, yielding a seriously recessionary surplus region east of the Rhine and north of the Alps, while the rest of Europe would be in the grip of vicious stagflation. Who do you think would benefit from this development? A progressive left, that will rise Phoenix-like from the ashes of Europe’s public institutions? Or the Golden Dawn Nazis, the assorted neofascists, the xenophobes and the spivs? I have absolutely no doubt as to which of the two will do best from a disintegration of the eurozone. I, for one, am not prepared to blow fresh wind into the sails of this postmodern version of the 1930s. If this means that it is we, the suitably erratic Marxists, who must try to save European capitalism from itself, so be it. Not out of love for European capitalism, for the eurozone, for Brussels, or for the European Central Bank, but just because we want to minimise the unnecessary human toll from this crisis.
"希臘、葡萄牙或意大利從歐元區的退出將很快導致歐洲資本主義的分裂［fragmentation］、然後在萊因河以東及阿爾卑斯山以北生產出一個嚴重衰退的盈餘地區［a seriously recessionary surplus region］，而同時歐洲其他區域將陷入惡性滯脹[vicious stagflation]之中。你認為這種後果將令誰獲益？一個從［被摧毀的］歐洲公共機構的灰燼中浴火重生的進步左翼？抑或金色曙光納綷黨［Golden Dawn Nazis］？各式各樣新法西斯？排外主義者［xenophobes］和小混混？對於這兩股力量當中究竟哪一股會在歐元區的解體中更好地興起，我完全沒有懸念。我們----以我自己為例----並不打算向這股後現代版的二十世紀三十年代[法西斯]風潮注入新活力。而假如這意味着正好是我們----一群適當地古怪的馬克思主義者----必須承擔試圖拯救歐洲資本主義的任務，那麼就這樣吧。不是出於對歐洲資本主義、對歐元區或對布魯塞爾或歐洲央行的愛，而只是因為我們希望在這場危機中盡量減少不必要的人類痛苦[to minimise the unnecessary human toll from this crisis]。"
The financial politics of the Syriza government closely followed these guidelines: no deficit, tight discipline, more money raised through taxes. Some German media recently characterised Varoufakis as a psychotic who lives in his own universe different from ours – but is he so radical?
薩利莎政府的金融政治遵從以下指引： 沒有赤字、嚴格的紀律、通過稅收籌募更多錢。一些德國媒體近期將瓦魯法基斯形容為一名生存在不同現實中的精神病患［psychotic］----但他真的有那麼激進嗎？
What is so enervating about Varoufakis is not his radicalism but his rational pragmatic modesty – if one looks closely at the proposals offered by Syriza, one cannot help noticing that they were once part of the standard moderate social-democratic agenda (in Sweden of the 1960s, the programme of the government was much more radical). It is a sad sign of our times that today you have to belong to a “radical” left to advocate these same measures – a sign of dark times, but also a chance for the left to occupy the space which, decades ago, was that of the moderate centre left.
瓦魯法基斯令人感到如此無力的不是他的激進主義而是他的理性和務實的謙卑[譯註： 在臨牀個案中，他者的務實理性是官能症患者最不想見到、最無法忍受的態度]----假如我們仔細看看薩利莎所提供的方案，我們將無法不注意到其細節其實曾經一度是溫和社會民主派的標準議程［standard moderate social democratic agenda］（在1960年代的瑞典，政府的方案比薩利莎的激進得多）。今天你必須要屬於 "激進"左翼才能擁護同樣的溫和措施這一點，反映了我們時代的悲哀。這是一個黑暗時代，但同時也為左翼佔領（數十年前屬於）溫和的中間偏左政治空間提供了機會。
But, perhaps, the endlessly repeated point about how modest Syriza’s politics are, just good old social democracy, somehow misses its target – as if, if we repeat it often enough, the Eurocrats will finally realise we’re not really dangerous and will help us. Syriza effectively is dangerous; it does pose a threat to the present orientation of the EU – today’s global capitalism cannot afford a return to the old welfare state.
但或許不斷地重複薩利莎的政治是何等溫和---並且只不過是令人懷緬的美好社會民主制----從某角度來說是完全命錯目標。彷彿假如這個論調重複得夠多，歐盟官僚們最終會明白到我們完全不危險然後幫助我們。薩利莎實質上是危險的，它確實對歐盟今天的傾向構成威脅----今天的全球資本主義已經無法承受朝向福利國家的回歸。
So there is something hypocritical in the reassurances about the modesty of what Syriza wants: in effect, it wants something that is not possible within the co-ordinates of the existing global system. A serious strategic choice will have to be made: what if the moment has come to drop the mask of modesty and openly advocate the much more radical change that is needed to secure even a modest gain?
因此，不斷重申薩利莎的要求的謙卑帶有某種虛偽： 實際上它正在要求獲得一種在今天的全球系統座標中不可能獲得的東西。我們將要做一個嚴肅的策略選擇：假如那個放下謙卑面具、並擁護一個激進得多的改變（即使是僅僅為了確保一個卑微的成果[a modest gain]）的時刻已經來臨又如何？
Many critics of the Greek referendum claimed that it was a case of pure demagogic posturing, mockingly pointing out that it was not clear what the referendum was about. If anything, the referendum was not about the euro or the drachma, about Greece in the EU or outside it: the Greek government repeatedly emphasised its desire to remain in the EU and in the eurozone. Again, the critics automatically translated the key political question raised by the referendum into an administrative decision about particular economic measures.
很多希臘公投的批評者聲稱，公投是一個純粹煽動性的姿態，並嘲弄地指出大家連公投的主題究竟是甚麼都搞不清楚。在任何情況下，希臘公投和歐羅或德拉馬克無關，也和希臘留在或離開歐盟無關： 希臘政府重複強調了他們留在歐盟和歐元區內的意願。又一次，批評者將希臘公投帶出的核心政治議題［key political question］自動翻譯為［automatically translated］關於一堆具體經濟措施的一個行政決定［an administrative decision］。
***
In an interview with Bloomberg on 2 July, Varoufakis made clear the true stakes of the referendum. The choice was between the continuation of the EU politics of the past years that brought Greece to the edge of ruin – the fiction of “extend and pretend” (extending the payback period, but pretending that all debts will eventually be paid) – and a new, realist beginning that would no longer rely on such fictions, and would provide a concrete plan for how to start the actual recovery of the Greek economy.
在7月2日接受媒體訪問時，瓦魯法基斯指出了希臘公投的真正賭注［或核心議題］。人們面臨的選擇有兩種： 繼續過去幾年來一路將希臘領向毀滅的歐盟政治----"延長並假扮" (延長還債期，同時假扮債務最終將被還清）的假象----或一個全新的、務實的、不再依賴假象的新開始、並且為如何開始實際恢復希臘經濟提供具體計劃的一個選擇。
Without such a plan, the crisis would just reproduce itself again and again. On the same day, even the IMF conceded that Greece needs large-scale debt relief to create “a breathing space” and get the economy moving (it proposes a 20-year moratorium on debt payments).
沒有這種計劃，危機將不斷自我複製。在同一天，連國際貨幣基金這種[極右]機構都被迫公開承認希臘需要大型債務減免以便創造"一個能夠呼吸的空間"並恢復其經濟動力（IMF提出一個20年的債務延付方案）。
The No in the Greek referendum was thus much more than a simple choice between two different approaches to economic crisis. The Greek people have heroically resisted the despicable campaign of fear that mobilised the lowest instincts of self-preservation. They have seen through the brutal manipulation of their opponents, who falsely presented the referendum as a choice between euro and drachma, between Greece in Europe and “Grexit”.
希臘公投中的No[不]因此遠遠多於在兩種解決經濟危機方案中做一個簡單的選擇。希臘人民英雄地[heroically]扺擋了那種利用人類最底層自我保護本能[lowest instincts]的卑鄙的恐懼運動，他們已看穿了對手的冷血操縱----這些人虛假地將公投呈現為在歐羅和德拉馬克、在"歐盟的希臘"和"退歐的希臘"之間二擇其一的[假]選擇。
Their No was a No to the Eurocrats who prove daily that they are unable to drag Europe out of its inertia. It was a No to the continuation of business as usual; a desperate cry telling us all that things cannot go on the usual way. It was a decision for authentic political vision against the strange combination of cold technocracy and hot racist clichés about lazy, free-spending Greeks. It was a rare victory for principle against egotist and ultimately self-destructive opportunism. The No that won was a Yes to full awareness of the crisis in Europe; a Yes to the need to enact a new beginning.
希臘人民向歐盟官僚宣告的No[不]，每天都向我們證明這些官僚沒有能力叫醒昏睡的歐洲。這是一個向那些無視人類痛苦如常活動的商業所發出的No[不]；是一個告訴我們所有人：事情不能再這樣繼續下去的No[不]；一個反對冷漠技術官僚和（揑造懶惰、亂花錢的希臘人故事的）狂熱種族主義濫調這兩者的詭異結合的No[不]----它是一個擁抱真實政治的決定。它同時也是原則對自私自利［egotist］的罕有勝利----換言之終極而言是原則對自我毀滅的機會主義的罕有勝利。公投給出的No[不]其實是宣告歐洲在危機中的全面覺醒的一個Yes[好]，一個啟動歐洲新開始的Yes[好]。
It is now up to the EU to act. Will it be able to awaken from its self-satisfied inertia and understand the sign of hope delivered by the Greek people? Or will it unleash its wrath on Greece in order to be able to continue its dogmatic dream?
現在歐盟要做決定了，究竟它會不會從自滿的昏睡中醒過來並意識到希臘人民所傳遞的希望徵兆？抑或它將向希臘人大發雷霆以便延續其教條主義美夢［continue its dogmatic dream］？
Slavoj Žižek’s is a senior researcher at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia and international director at Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities. His latest book is “Trouble in Paradise: from the End of History to the End of Capitalism” (Allen Lane)
編者註 : 齊澤克是斯洛文尼亞的盧布爾雅那大學的高級研究員以及伯克貝克人文學院的國際總監。他最近的作品是"天堂裡的麻煩 : 由歷史的終結到資本主義的終結" (出版社 : Allen Lane)
